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INTRODUCTION
The most important lawsuit you have never heard of was filed 
against President Donald Trump on February 8, 2017.1 Plaintiffs 
* The author is an Associate Professor at the City University of New York (CUNY) 
School of Public Health, Secretary of the Environmental Section of the American Public 
Health Association, Director of the Atlantic Emerging Technologies and Industrial Hygiene
Training Center funded by the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences Super-
fund Hazardous Substances Basic Research and Training Program, and the author of seven-
teen books on environmental law and policy.
This paper benefitted from workshops at the CUNY School of Public Health on De-
cember 13, 2016, and the University of Maryland School of Public Health, Maryland Insti-
tute of Applied Environmental Health, on February 3, 2017. The author would like to thank 
the following professors for generously providing their time, thoughts, and comments: Dr. 
Glen Johnson, Dr. Daliah Heller, Dr. Lynn Roberts, Dr. Nick Freudenberg, Dr. Chris 
Palmedo, Dr. Grace Sembajwe, Dr. Sean Haley, Dr. Stephen M. Roth, Dr. Donald K. Milton, 
Dr. Paul Turner, and Dr. Devon C. Payne-Sturges.
1. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pub. Citizen v. Trump, No. 17-253 
(D.D.C. 2017); Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, Pub. Citi-
zen v. Trump, No. 17-253 (D.D.C. 2018).
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were an unlikely alliance between a congressional watch group, an 
environmental group, and a labor group: Public Citizen, Inc., the 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (NRDC), and the Com-
munications Workers of America, an affiliate of the American Fed-
eration of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-
CIO).2 While this was not the classic “Baptists and Bootleggers”3
scenario, it was certainly an illustration of how the Trump admin-
istration’s efforts at regulatory reform created a truly novel para-
digm. President Trump signed Executive Order (E.O.) 13771 
shortly after his inauguration. E.O. 13771 implemented President 
Trump’s campaign promise that the federal government would re-
peal two federal regulations for every new regulation it promulgat-
ed. The crux of the 2017 lawsuit argued that E.O. 13771
corrupts agency decisionmaking across the board because 
every decision whether to issue a significant new rule, every 
decision about the content of the rule, and every decision 
about repealing a rule must be made under the shadow of 
the Order’s mandate to identify and repeal two regulations 
to offset the cost of any one regulation issued.4
While media attention focused extensively on the Executive Order 
13769 travel ban,5 few media outlets addressed the equally im-
portant series of executive orders issued by President Trump that 
spelled out the new President’s regulatory reform agenda.6 E.O. 
13771 was only the first in a series of President Trump’s regulatory 
reform initiatives issued in fulfillment of his campaign promise to 
reduce the burden of federal regulation on American businesses. 
The presidential deregulatory directives dismantling prior envi-
2. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Pub. Citizen v. Trump, No. 17-253 
(D.D.C. 2017); see also Consumer, Environmental and Workers Groups File Legal Challenge to 
Trump’s One-in, Two-out Executive Order on Regulations, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Feb. 8, 2017), 
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/pressroomredirect.cfm?ID=10155.
3. See Bruce Yandle, Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist, 7 
REG. 12 (1983) (discussing the Baptists and Bootlegger economic theory); see also Bruce 
Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Warming Battle, 26 HARV. ENVT’L L.
REV. 177 (2002).
4. Motion for Summary Judgment at 17, Pub. Citizen v. Trump, No. 17-253 (D.D.C. 
2017).
5. Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 8,977 (Feb. 1, 2017).
6. Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 
31, 2017); Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the 
Waters of the United States Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017); Enforcing the Regula-
tory Reform Agenda, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Mar. 1, 2017); Reducing Regulation and Control-
ling Regulatory Costs, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
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ronmental and natural resources policy came quickly and can be 
summarized in the flowchart below7: 
Regulatory responses implementing the presidential directives 
took more time and can be summarized in the flowchart below:
On April 17, 2017, fourteen states filed an amicus brief support-
ing Trump’s deregulatory initiative.8 The brief signaled that the 
civil war over the efficacy of federal regulation ignited during the 
2016 election cycle would continue with vigor during the Trump 
presidency. The states supporting Trump’s deregulation plans 
were: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, 
Michigan, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, West Virgin-
ia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.9
The states supporting E.O. 13771 argued that “the administra-
tive state has accelerated further the long-term growth of new regu-
latory burdens, while rarely eliminating unnecessary regulations 
issued in the past” and the “unlawfully-imposed burden has been 
largely borne by the States and their citizens.”10 The United States 
Chamber of Commerce, America Fuel and Petrochemical Manu-
facturers, American Petroleum Institute, the Association of Ameri-
 7. Streamlining Permitting and Reducing Regulatory Burdens for Domestic Manufac-
turing, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,667 (Jan. 30, 2017); Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory 
Costs, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017); Exec. Order 1377, Enforcing the Regulatory Re-
form Agenda, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Mar. 1, 2017); Exec. Order 13778, Restoring the Rule of 
Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the “Waters of the United States’” 
Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017); Executive Order 13783, Promoting Energy Inde-
pendence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2018).
 8. See Brief of the States of West Virginia, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respond-
ent, Pub. Citizen v. Trump, No. 17-253 (D.D.C. 2017).
 9. Id.
10. Id. at 1 (citing PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 26–29 
(2014)); Michael R. See, Willful Blindness: Federal Agencies’ Failure to Comply with the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act’s Periodic Review Requirement—And Current Proposals to Invigorate the Act, 33 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1199 (2006).
OMB 
Interim 
Guidance
s February 2, 
2017
OMB 
Docket
s February 2, 
2017
DOC  
Docket
s March 7, 
2017
OMB Final 
Guidance 
for RRO
s April 6, 2017
EPA 
Docket
s April 13, 
2017
DOI 
Docket
s June 22, 
2017
Memorandum: 
“Streamlining 
Permitting and 
Reducing 
Regulatory 
Burdens for 
Domestic 
Manufacturing,” 
January 24, 2017
E.O. 13771
s January 30, 2017
E.O. 13777
s Februry 24, 2017
E.O. 13778
s Waters of the US 
(WOTUS)
s March 3, 2017
E.O. 13783 
s Energy 
Independence
s Clean Power 
Plan
s BLM Fracking 
Rules
s March 31, 2017
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can Railroads, the National Association of Manufacturers, and Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business also filed an amicus 
brief in support of the Trump two-for-one deregulatory plan.11
Although the Public Citizens v. Trump suit was dismissed on Feb-
ruary 26, 2018, for lack of standing,12 plaintiffs filed a curative 
amended complaint on April 2, 2018, and established standing by 
specifying which regulatory initiatives critical to public health and 
the environment that either were, or are likely to be, weakened or 
scrapped because of E.O. 13771.13 The amended complaint reiter-
ated, “the Executive Order is blocking, delaying, or forcing the re-
peal of regulations needed to protect health, safety, and the envi-
ronment, across a broad range of topics—from automobile safety, 
to occupational health, to air pollution.”14
This Article explores the Trump regulatory reform agenda and 
its potential impact on environmental determinants of health. The 
Article begins with a discussion of the Department of Commerce’s 
(DOC or Commerce) initial fact-finding investigation to evaluate 
the impact of federal regulations on domestic manufacturing. The 
Article next presents an overview of the Trump administration’s 
11. Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 7, Pub. Citizen 
v. Trump, No. 17-253 (D.D.C. 2017) (“Executive Order 13771 seeks to address the problem
of ever-growing government regulations by imposing a regulatory budget that directs federal
agencies to eliminate outdated and ineffective regulations when issuing new regulations that
impose significant compliance costs on regulated entities. In doing so, the Order merely 
builds on a long and bipartisan history of executive orders that direct agencies to carefully 
consider the costs of new regulations and to review the effectiveness of existing regulations. 
Critically, however, Executive Order 13771 takes the next logical step and creates an incen-
tive for federal agencies to not only review, but also eliminate ineffective regulations.”).
12. Order, Pub. Citizen v. Trump, No. 17-253 (D.D.C. 2018) (“This is not to say that a
plaintiff—or, indeed, that the present Plaintiffs—will never be able to establish standing to 
challenge the Executive Order. On the present record, however, the Court must conclude
that it lacks jurisdiction.”).
13. Complaint, Pub. Citizen v. Trump, No. 17-253 (D.D.C. 2018). Other defendants 
were: Mick Mulvaney, Director of the Office of Management and Budget; Rick Perry, Secre-
tary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy (DOE); Elaine L. Chao, Secretary of Transporta-
tion, U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT); Heidi King, Deputy Administrator of the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA); Loren Sweatt, Acting Assistant 
Secretary of Labor for Occupational Safety and Health (OSHA), U.S. Department of Labor; 
R. Alexander Acosta, Secretary of Labor, U.S. Department of Labor (DOL); Ryan Zinke, 
Secretary of the Interior, U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI); Raymond Martinez, Ad-
ministrator, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA); Jim Kurth, Deputy Di-
rector and Acting Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS); Scott Pruitt, Administra-
tor, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); Howard “Skip” Elliot, Administrator, 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA); Chris Oliver, Assistant 
Administrator for Fisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS): David Zatezalo, As-
sistant Secretary for Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), U.S. Department of 
Labor; and Ronald Batory, Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). See also
Juan Carlos Rodriguez, Challengers Of Trump’s ‘two-for-one’ Order Seek To Revive Suit, 
LAW360 (April 4, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1029645/challengers-of-trump-s-
two-for-one-order-seek-to-revive-suit.
14. Complaint, Pub. Citizen v. Trump, No. 17-253 (D.D.C. 2018).
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regulatory reform formula as announced in E.O. 13771 and the in-
terim guidance explaining E.O. 13771 and E.O. 13777 (the execu-
tive order announcing the Trump administration’s plans to en-
force the regulatory reform plan announced in E.O. 13771). The 
Article then examines the federal agency initiatives undertaken in 
response to the Trump directives, including both fact-finding 
dockets and regulatory action published in the federal register ap-
plying the executive orders. This Article concludes with concerns 
about the practical effects of the new policy on the future of envi-
ronmental determinants of health and recommends that the policy 
be reevaluated after a year to understand the unintended effects of 
this means of deregulation.15
I. FACT-FINDING EFFORTS: DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE DOCKET
On January 24, 2017, before drafting any regulatory reform ex-
ecutive orders, President Trump issued a memorandum entitled 
“Streamlining Permitting and Reducing Regulatory Burdens for 
Domestic Manufacturing”16 as one of his very first acts in office. 
The memorandum directed the Secretary of Commerce, in coor-
dination with the Secretaries of Agriculture and Energy, the Ad-
ministrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the 
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the 
Administrator of the Small Business Administration, and other 
agency heads, to conduct outreach to stakeholders concerning the 
impact of Federal regulations on domestic manufacturing.17 It is 
unclear when the Department of Commerce began collecting data 
in response to President Trump’s memorandum but, on March 7, 
2017, Commerce established a docket to collect comments from 
industry leaders and other interested parties. Commerce set a very 
tight timetable. The due date for comments was March 31, 2017. 
Commerce asked for comments about:
(1) industry’s experience with federal permitting as it im-
pacted the construction and expansion of domestic 
manufacturing facilities; and
15. See Conclusion infra. Shell, Comment on Interim Guidance Implementing Section 2 
of the Executive Order of January 30, 2017, Titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling 
Regulatory Costs” (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OMB-2017-
0002-0050.
16. Streamlining Permitting and Reducing Regulatory Burdens for Domestic Manufac-
turing, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,667 (Jan. 30, 2017).
17. Id.; see also Economic Analysis for the Proposed Definition of “Waters of the United 
States,” EPA, https://www.epa.gov/wotus-rule/economic-analysis-proposed-definition-waters-
united-states-recodification-pre-existing (analyzing the economic impact of the revised rule).
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(2) the general, non-permit related regulations that ad-
versely impacted domestic manufacturers.18
To better understand the context of the comments, Commerce
asked each commenter to describe their operations, including the 
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code(s),19
items manufactured, location of facilities, number of employees, 
and approximate sales revenue. Next, DOC asked eight specific 
questions: five regarding manufacturing and three concerning 
regulatory compliance burdens.20 Commerce’s stated goal was to 
collect data from regulated industries concerning the potential to 
streamline federal construction permits for building and/or ex-
panding domestic manufacturing facilities. Commerce also asked 
for thoughts on ways to reduce regulatory burdens for domestic 
manufacturers.21 One-hundred and seventy comments were posted 
in the DOC docket in response to Commerce’s fact-finding re-
quest.
18. Impact of Federal Regulations on Domestic Manufacturing, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,786 
(Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOC-2017-0001-0001.
19. North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes are used by Federal 
statistical agencies to classify different types of business “for the purpose of collecting, ana-
lyzing, and publishing statistical data related to the U.S. business economy.” See Introduction 
to NAICS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/ (last visited July 
24, 2018).
20. Id. Regarding the permitting process, Commerce asked the following:
• “How many permits from a Federal agency are required to build, expand or 
operate your manufacturing facilities? Which Federal agencies require per-
mits and how long does it take to obtain them?
• “Do any of the Federal permits overlap with (or duplicate) other federal 
permits or those required by State or local agencies? If the answer is yes, how 
many permits? From which Federal agencies?
• “Briefly describe the most onerous part of your permitting process.
• “If you could make one change to the Federal permitting process applicable 
to your manufacturing business or facilities, what would it be? How could the 
permitting process be modified to better suit your needs?
• “Are there Federal, State, or local agencies that you have worked with on 
permitting whose practices should be widely implemented? What is it you 
like about those practices?”
Regarding regulatory compliance, Commerce requested the following:
• “Please list the top four regulations that you believe are most burdensome 
for your manufacturing business. Please identify the agency that issues each 
one. Specific citation of codes from the Code of Federal Regulations would 
be appreciated.
• “How could regulatory compliance be simplified within your industry or sec-
tor?
• “Please provide any other specific recommendations, not addressed by the 
questions above, that you believe would help reduce unnecessary Federal 
agency regulation of your business.”
21. Id.
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This Article uses established principles of legal epidemiology to 
conduct review of the Commerce docket.22 The comments in the 
docket were collected, copied, and indexed in a sortable spread-
sheet using the docket identification number assigned by the 
agency on Regulations.gov. A sample set of comments was reviewed 
collectively in order for a team of coders to define terms and de-
velop a consistent approach. Two coders divided all the indexed
comments and coded half the materials. The coders then reviewed 
each other’s findings. The coders used a spreadsheet to keep track 
of their results. The coders and supervising faculty held regular 
meetings to reconcile differences in coding and to evaluate search 
terms for reviewing the docket. A coder who was not part of the in-
itial review and who did not participate in the first round of coding 
(naïve coder) was assigned to spot-check results to ensure con-
sistency. The naïve coder selected random comments using an in-
terval of ten percent of the total number of comments reviewed in 
the docket.23 A Computer Assisted/Aided Qualitative Data Analysis 
22. For an explanation of how to conduct policy surveillance using principles of legal 
epidemiology see David Presley, et al., Resources for Policy Surveillance: A Report Prepared for the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Public Health Law Program, SSRN 2567695 (2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2567695; David Presley, et al. A Scan of 
Existing 50 State Survey and Policy Surveillance Resources, SRN 2523011 (2014), http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2523011; David Presley, et al., Creating Legal 
Data for Public Health Monitoring and Evaluation: Delphi Standards for Policy Surveillance, 43 J.L.,
MED & ETHICS 27, 27–31 (2015); Scott Burris, A Technical Guide for Policy Surveillance, Temple 
University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-34 (2014); Sarah Happy, Technical Standards for 
Policy Surveillance: Delphi Process and Technical Guide, 142nd APHA Annual Meeting and Expo-
sition (Nov. 15–Nov. 19, 2014), https://apha.confex.com/apha/142am/webprogram/
Paper309688.html. For other applications, see Elizabeth Glass Geltman, et al., Inquiry into the 
Impact of Bush’s Executive Order 13211 on Environmental and Public Health Regulation, 27 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 200 (2016); Elizabeth Glass Geltman, et al., Impact of Executive Order 
13211 on Environmental Regulation: An Empirical Study, ENERGY POL’Y 89 (2016): 302–310; 
Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Regulation of Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive 
Materials (TENORM) under State Law: How Effective Is it? What More Needs to Be Done?, 143rd 
APHA Annual Meeting and Exposition (Oct. 31Nov. 4, 2015); Elizabeth Glass Geltman, 21 
Years Later: Has Executive Order 12898 (entitled Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in 
Minority Populations and Low-income Populations) Worked?, 143rd APHA Annual Meeting and 
Exposition (Oct. 31–Nov. 4, 2015); Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Policy Surveillance on the Impact 
of Bush’s Executive Order 13211 (Requiring Preparation of a Statement of Energy Effects as a Condi-
tion to Federal Action) on Environmental and Public Health Policy, 143rd APHA Annual Meeting 
and Exposition (Oct. 31–Nov. 4, 2015).
23. For an explanation of the methods used to develop codes and conduct coding, see 
David Presley, et al., Creating Legal Data for Public Health Monitoring and Evaluation: Delphi 
Standards for Policy Surveillance, 43 J.L., MED. & ETHICS 27 (2015); Scott Burris & Evan D. An-
derson, Legal Regulation of Health-Related Behavior: A Half-Century of Public Health Law 
Research, Annual Review of Law & Social Science, Forthcoming (2013); Scott Burris, et al., Mov-
ing from Intersection to Integration: Public Health Law Research and Public Health Systems 
and Services Research, 90 MILBANK Q. 375 (2012); Evan D. Anderson, et al., Measuring Statu-
tory Law and Regulations for Empirical Research, PUB. HEALTH L. RES. (Feb. 28, 2012); Jennifer 
K. Ibrahim, et al., Public Health Law Research: Exploring Law in Public Health Systems, 18 
J. PUB. HEALTH M. PRAC. 499 (2012); Scott C. Burris & Evan D. Anderson, Making the Case for 
Laws that Improve Health: The Work of the Public Health Law Research National Program Office, 39 
J.L., MED. & ETHICS 1, 15–20 (2011); Scott Burris, Law in a Social Determinants Strategy: A 
676 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [Vol. 51:4
Software (CAQDAS) allowed coders to cross-check for consistency 
using auto-coding of key words and synonyms. Then, the results 
were analyzed using descriptive statistics to determine patterns and 
themes.
Examination of the Commerce docket, DOC-2017-0001-0001, 
identified interesting patterns. More than half the comments (fifty-
nine percent) stated the EPA permitting process was overly cum-
bersome and in need of reform. Nearly a third of commenters 
(twenty-nine percent) identified the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) as a target for deregulation. Other 
agencies that received notable mention by industry as suitable tar-
gets for deregulation included the Army Corps of Engineers (the 
Corps or COE), the Department of Energy (DOE), various entities 
within the Department of Interior (DOI), and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). The graph below summarizes the numbers 
of comments in the Commerce docket that raised concerns about 
the regulatory processes of various agencies.
GRAPH 1. AGENCIES THAT RAISED CONCERN: 
IMPACT OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS ON DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING
DOC-2017-0001-0001 (N=170)
From a substantive perspective, over a third of comments (thirty-
eight percent) indicated that permitting pursuant to the Clean Air 
Act needs to be reformed or deregulated. The coalition of compa-
Public Health Law Research Perspective, PUBLIC HEALTH REPORTS, 126 Suppl. 3, 22 (2011). 
See also Evan D. Anderson & Scott Burris, EDUCATED GUESSING: GETTING RESEARCHERS AND 
RESEARCH KNOWLEDGE INTO POLICY INNOVATION, included in TANIA VOON, ET AL.,
REGULATING TOBACCO, ALCOHOL, AND UNHEALTHY FOODS: THE LEGAL ISSUES (Routledge, 
2014).
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nies disgruntled with EPA’s air permitting included corporations 
that represent a sizable portion of the U.S. economy. For example, 
one comment that highlighted problems with the Clean Air Act’s 
permitting process was written by Boeing, British Petroleum, Eli 
Lily, Georgia-Pacific, Invista, Koch, Merck, Occidental Petroleum, 
Phillips 66, and Proctor and Gamble.24 A second group that target-
ed Clean Air Act permitting included almost the entire petroleum 
industry.25
EPA has no organic statute granting general authority to the 
Agency to protect the environment.26 Instead, Congress has stipu-
lated EPA’s powers through a series of specific pieces of legislation 
aimed to protect the environment by targeting different media: air, 
water, hazardous waste, and the like.27 Numerous industry com-
ments identified all EPA-administered statutes as targets for dereg-
ulation. The graph below depicts the number of comments discuss-
ing each of the major federal environmental statutes administered 
by EPA28 that commenters contributing to the Commerce docket 
believed needed significant reform.
24. Comment of BD (Becton, Dickinson and Company) on behalf of National Envi-
ronmental Development Association’s Clean Air Project (Mar. 31, 2017), https://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOC-2017-0001-0161.
25. Comment of Lee Fuller (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=
DOC-2017-0001-0086. The coalition included Independent Petroleum Association of Ameri-
ca (IPAA), the American Association of Professional Landmen (AAPL), the Association of 
Energy Service Companies (AESC), the Domestic Energy Producers Alliance (DEPA), the 
International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC), the International Association of 
Geophysical Contractors (IAGC), the National Stripper Well Association (NSWA), the Pe-
troleum Equipment & Services Association (PESA), Arkansas Independent Producers and 
Royalty Owners Association, California Independent Petroleum Association, Coalbed Me-
thane Association of Alabama, Colorado Oil & Gas Association, East Texas Producers & 
Royalty Owners Association, Eastern Kansas Oil & Gas Association, Florida Independent Pe-
troleum Association, Idaho Petroleum Council, Illinois Oil & Gas Association, Independent 
Oil & Gas Association of New York, Independent Oil & Gas Association of West Virginia, 
Independent Oil Producers’ Agency, Independent Oil Producers Association Tri-State, In-
dependent Petroleum Association of New Mexico, Indiana Oil & Gas Association, Kansas 
Independent Oil & Gas Association, Kentucky Oil & Gas Association, Louisiana Oil & Gas 
Association, Michigan Oil & Gas Association, Mississippi Independent Producers & Royalty 
Association, Montana Petroleum Association, National Association of Royalty Owners, Ne-
braska Independent Oil & Gas Association, New Mexico Oil & Gas Association, New York 
State Oil Producers Association, North Dakota Petroleum Council, Northern Montana Oil 
and Gas Association, Ohio Oil & Gas Association, Oklahoma Independent Petroleum Asso-
ciation, Panhandle Producers & Royalty Owners Association, Pennsylvania Independent Oil 
& Gas Association, Permian Basin Petroleum Association, Petroleum Association of Wyo-
ming, Southeastern Ohio Oil & Gas Association, Tennessee Oil & Gas Association, Texas 
Alliance of Energy Producers, Texas Oil and Gas Association, Texas Independent Producers 
and Royalty Owners Association, Utah Petroleum Association, Virginia Oil and Gas Associa-
tion, West Slope Colorado Oil & Gas Association, West Virginia Oil and Natural Gas Associa-
tion and Western Energy Alliance.
26. See generally Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Reinventing EPA to Con-
form with the New American Environmentality, 23 COLUM. J. ENVT’L L.J. 1 (1998).
27. See generally id.
28. The laws examined were as follows:
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GRAPH 2. LAWS THAT RAISED CONCERN: 
IMPACT OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS ON DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING
DOC-2017-0001-0001 (N=170)
Although the Clean Power Plan, the Clean Water Act “Waters of 
The United States” (WOTUS),29 and the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment’s (BLM) fracking rule30 were the subject of great debate dur-
ing the 2016 election season31 and were specifically singled out for 
• Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA or Superfund), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (1980);
• The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671;
• The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388;
• Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–11050;
• Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544;
• Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136;
• Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992;
• Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j; and
• Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2697.
29. The scope of WOTUS has been debated for decades. For a historical discussion, see 
generally Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, Regulation of Non-Adjacent Wetlands Under Section 404 of 
the Clean Water Act, 23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 615 (1988).
30. For discussion of the BLM fracking rule, see generally Elizabeth Ann Glass Gelt-
man, Drilling for Common Ground: How Public Opinion Tracks Experts in the Debate over Federal 
Regulation of Shale Oil & Gas Extraction, 35 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 59 (2016).
31. See generally Elizabeth Glass Geltman, The New Anti-Federalism: Late Term Obama Envi-
ronmental Regulations and the Rise of Trump, 93 N.D. L. REV. 243 (2018).
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review by President Trump in Executive Orders 1377832 and 
13783,33 only twelve comments (seven percent) discussed the re-
peal of the Clean Power Plan, only six (three percent) addressed 
federal regulation of hydraulic fracking (on or off federal land), 
and only twenty-seven (fifteen percent) discussed the WOTUS 
Rule. More comments focused on pre-Obama environmental regu-
lations under the Clean Air Act: thirty-eight comments (twenty-two 
percent) identified National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS)34 permitting and thirty-six comments (twenty-one per-
cent) discussed New Source Review (NSR).35 The graph below lists 
the number of comments in the Commerce docket that discussed 
various provisions and programs required by statutes administered 
by EPA as in need of regulatory reform. 
GRAPH 3. RULES THAT RAISED CONCERN: 
IMPACT OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS ON DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING 
DOC-2017-0001-0001 (N=170)
The Commerce docket was the Trump adminstration’s first ef-
fort to gather data concerning regulatory reform.36 The docket 
32. Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing the 
Waters of the United States Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017).
33. Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
34. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 71 Fed. Reg. 
61,144 (Oct. 17, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
35. See EPA, NEW SOURCE REVIEW (NSR) PERMITTING, https://www.epa.gov/nsr. 
36. Streamlining Permitting and Reducing Regulatory Burdens for Domestic Manufac-
turing, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,667 (Jan. 30, 2017).
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sought information directly from industry and asked the com-
menters to provide detail about their operations with submitted 
comments.37 Certain themes emerged. Industry resoundly echoed 
concerns candidate Trump identified on the campaign trail re-
garding the need for reform the environmental permitting pro-
cesses—expecially air permits. Classic NAAQS38 and NSR39 air pro-
grams were described by numerous commenters as overly time 
consuiming and expensive. Recent Obama-era programs, such as 
the Clean Power Plan, WOTUS, and renewed efforts in EPA’s Inte-
grated Risk Information System (IRIS) mandated by Obama-era 
revisions to the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)40 all received 
significantly less discussion.
II. EXECUTIVE ORDER 13771
On January 30, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 
13771 entitled Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs,41
fulfilling his campaign promise to reform the regulatory process. 
By signing E.O. 13771, the Trump administration officially de-
clared that regulatory reform was “essential to manage the costs as-
sociated with the governmental imposition of private expenditures 
required to comply with Federal regulations.”42 E.O. 13771 estab-
lished two critical components. First, E.O. 13771 required federal 
agencies to terminate two regulations for every one regulation 
newly implemented.43 Second, E.O. 13771 mandated that the net 
cost of a new federal regulation must be zero dollars.44 The man-
date began immediately. As such, even in President Trump’s first 
calendar year in office, the total incremental costs of all new regu-
lations for fiscal year 2017, including repealed regulations, were 
required to not exceed zero.45 In calculating net regulatory costs, 
agencies were allowed to include regulations repealed by Congress 
under the Congressional Review Act.46
37. Id.
38. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 71 Fed. Reg. 
61,144 (Oct. 17, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50).
39. See EPA, NEW SOURCE REVIEW (NSR) PERMITTING, https://www.epa.gov/nsr.
40. See EPA, INTEGRATED RISK INFORMATION SYSTEM, https://www.epa.gov/iris.
41. Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See also 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2). The Congressional Review Act (CRA) was enacted as 
Subtitle E of the Republican Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No. 
104–121). It was signed into law by President Bill Clinton on March 29, 1996.
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From a procedural standpoint, E.O. 13771 added new dictates 
for the Office of Budget Management (OMB). After E.O. 13771, 
OMB was required to identify annually the total amount of incre-
mental costs that would be allowed for each federal agency when 
issuing new regulations and repealing regulations for the next fis-
cal year.47 After OMB sets the incremental cost allowance, federal 
agencies cannot exceed that amount.48
Although new incremental costs associated with new regulations 
must be “offset by the elimination of existing costs associated with 
at least two prior regulations,”49 federal agencies eliminating exist-
ing costs associated with prior regulations must do so in accord-
ance with the Administrative Procedure Act and other applicable 
law.50 Hence, both the proposed new regulation and the existing 
regulations to be repealed must go through public notice and 
comment. Overall, this component of E.O. 13771 makes it ex-
tremely difficult to promulgate new regulations. Rather than just 
evaluating and developing one set of regulations, any federal agen-
cy developing a new regulation must simultaneously detail and jus-
tify why the other two unrelated regulations must be removed. The 
agency must project and calculate costs to industry for all three 
regulations and ensure that there are no net costs to industry.
Long and short-term health benefits to the public (including po-
tential cost savings to Medicare and Medicaid through adverse 
health effects avoided)51 are not considered in the economic calcu-
lation mandated by OMB pursuant to E.O. 13771. 52
E.O. 13771 required the OMB Director to develop guidance for 
federal agencies that would:
• Standardize the measurement and estimation of regu-
latory costs;
47. Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339, 9,340 (Feb. 3, 2017).
48. Id. For purposes offsetting cost allocation, the OMB Director has discretion to set 
the total incremental cost allowance in a manner that allows an increase or requires a reduc-
tion in total regulatory cost. Once OMB has set the total allowable incremental costs of regu-
lations for each agency for the budget year, the head of each federal agency must identify 
regulations that increase incremental cost, the offsetting regulations, and the agency’s best 
approximation of the total costs or savings associated new or repealed regulations. 82 Fed. 
Reg. at 9,339.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. For discussion of valuation of cost savings due to air pollution controls, see EPA,
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1990-2020, THE SECOND PROSPECTIVE STUDY
(April 2011), https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/benefits-and-costs-clean-air-act-
1990-020-second-prospective-study. See also S. Scott Voorhees et al., Cost-Benefit Analysis Meth-
ods for Assessing Air Pollution Control Programs in Urban Environments—A Review, 6 ENVTL.
HEALTH & PREVENTIVE MEDICINE 63 (2001); Ben H. Carpenter et al., Health Costs of Air Pollu-
tion: a Study of Hospitalization Costs, 69 AMERICAN J. PUB. HEALTH 1232 (1979).
52. Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339, 9,340 (Feb. 3, 2017).
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• Create standards for determining
o that which qualifies as new and offsetting regula-
tions; and
o the costs of existing regulations that are consid-
ered for elimination;
• Create processes for accounting for costs in different 
fiscal years;
• Develop methods to oversee the issuance of rules with 
costs offset by savings at different times or different 
agencies; and
• State what emergencies and other circumstances 
might justify individual waivers from the dictates of 
E.O. 13771.53
Trump’s directive only carved out two general exceptions to the 
two-for-one dictate. First, E.O. 13771 would not apply if the new 
regulation was required by existing law.54 Second, E.O. 13771 also 
would not apply if the OMB Director made an exception in writ-
ing.55
III. INTERIM GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTING E.O. 13771
Three days after signing E.O. 13771, on February 2, 2017, Presi-
dent Trump signed an interim guidance that theoretically invited 
public comment, but in fact allowed the public only eight days to 
do so.56 The guidance reiterated the overarching goal of reform 
was to identify and repeal outdated, ineffective, or unnecessary 
regulatory actions. The mandate that federal agencies issue two de-
regulatory actions for each significant new regulatory action that 
imposed costs was to ensure “the prudent management and con-
trol of regulatory costs imposed on society by agencies attempting 
to achieve regulatory benefits”57 in a manner similar to fiscal 
spending caps.58
The interim guidance clarified that E.O. 13771’s two-for-one re-
quirement defined “significant” as it had been historically defined 
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Memorandum for: Regulatory Policy Officers at Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies and 
Managing and Exec. Dirs. of Certain Agencies and Comm’ns (2017), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/02/interim-guidance-implementing-section-2-
executive-order-january-30-2017.
57. Id. (“The regulatory cost cap has no effect on the requirements of E.O. 12866 or 
the consideration of regulatory benefits in making regulatory decisions.”)
58. Id.
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beginning with President Bill Clinton in 1993 with E.O. 12866.59
For purposes of effectuating E.O. 13771, savings from the two de-
regulatory actions must fully offset the costs of the new significant 
regulatory action.60 Costs are measured as “the opportunity cost to 
society” as defined in OMB Circular A-4.61 The E.O. 13777 mandate 
included advance notice of proposed rulemakings issued before 
President Trump took office.62 The Trump administration dictated 
that the two-for-one requirement would begin on February 2, 2017, 
and apply to federal agencies planning significant regulatory ac-
tions on or before September 30, 2017.63 For purposes of deregula-
tion, however, the federal agencies were not limited to repealing 
“significant rules.” The emphasis was reducing cost to industry, re-
gardless of whether the regulation was categorized as significant or 
not.64 The implementing guidance explained that:
Any existing regulatory action that imposes costs and the 
repeal or revision of which will produce verifiable savings 
may qualify. Meaningful burden reduction through the re-
peal or streamlining of mandatory reporting, recordkeep-
ing or disclosure requirements may also qualify.65
For example, in 2017, all fourteen Obama-era regulations over-
turned by Congress pursuant to the Congressional Review Act 
could be considered when calculating the offset to zero.66
59. 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
60. Cf. MEMORANDUM: INTERIM GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTING SECTION 2 OF THE EXEC.
ORDER OF JANUARY 30, 2017, TITLED “REDUCING REGULATION AND CONTROLLING 
REGULATORY COSTS” (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/02/
interim-guidance-implementing-section-2-executive-order-january-30-2017 (citing OMB Cir-
cular A-4.
61. Id. (citing OMB Circular A-4).
62. Id. For a discussion of Executive Order 12,866 see Elizabeth Glass Geltman et al., 
Impact of Executive Order 13211 on Environmental Regulation: An Empirical Study, 89 ENERGY 
POL’Y 302 (2016). See also Ted Gayer & W. Kip Viscusi, Determining the Proper Scope of Climate 
Change Policy Benefits in US Regulatory Analyses: Domestic Versus Global Approaches, 10 REV.
ENVT’L. ECON. & POL’Y 245 (2016); Lisa A. Robinson et al., Attention to Distribution in US Reg-
ulatory Analyses, 10 REV. ENVT’L ECON. & POL’Y 308 (2016); Cary Coglianese, Optimizing Gov-
ernment for an Optimizing Economy, (Univ. Pa. Law Sch. Inst. For Law & Econ. Research Paper
No. 16-13), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2789690, reprinted in KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION, NEW 
ENTREPRENEURIAL GROWTH AGENDA (2016), https://www.kauffman.org/neg/section-8#.
63. MEMORANDUM FOR: REGULATORY POLICY OFFICERS AT EXEC. DEP’TS AND AGENCIES 
AND MANAGING AND EXEC. DIRS. OF CERTAIN AGENCIES AND COMM’NS, (2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/briefing-room/presidential-
actions/related-omb-material/eo_iterim_guidance_reducing_regulations_controlling_
regulatory_costs.pdf.
64. See id.
65. Id.
66. Id.; cf. id. at 5–6 (“In practice, many regulatory actions can both impose new re-
quirements and remove or streamline existing requirements on the same regulated entities 
and within the same regulatory program. In this case, the agency must clearly identify the 
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Perhaps most significantly, federal agencies are required to 
confirm that they will continue to achieve their statutory missions 
even while undertaking massive deregulation67 and massive cuts in 
funding.68 The requirement to uphold environmental and health 
protection while reducing regulation (and maintain agency staff to 
enforce that which is left) strikes many as both arbitrary and un-
likely.69 Hence, the legal challenge alleging E.O. 13771 violates the 
U.S. Constitution’s Take Care Clause requiring the President to 
“take care that the law shall be faithfully executed” as a core execu-
tive function.70
The interim guidance for E.O. 13771 set only one safety valve to 
ensure that regulatory reductions did not impede population 
health or adversely impact the environment. The guidance allowed 
federal agencies to proceed with the promulgation of regulations 
required to comply with an imminent statutory or judicial deadline 
even if the agency proposing the new regulations cannot identify 
offsetting regulatory actions.71
IV. OMB INTERIM GUIDANCE AND DOCKET
REGARDING IMPLEMENTATION OF E.O. 13771
On February 2, 2017, OMB circulated the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs’ (OIRA’s) interim guidance on implement-
ing section 2 of E.O. 13771 to regulatory policy officers at federal 
specific provisions that are counted within the regulatory and deregulatory portion of the 
rules, and the costs and cost savings associated with each. The net cost impact (the differ-
ence between costs imposed and cost savings) of such rules will generally determine whether 
they are regulatory actions that need to be offset. Agencies, however, should avoid artificially 
bundling provisions that are not logically connected in a single regulatory action.” ); Cf. id.
at 6 (“Regulatory savings by a component in one agency can be used to offset a regulatory 
burden by a different component in that same agency.”). For a discussion of the fourteen 
rules reversed pursuant to the CRA, see Eric Lipton & Jasmine C. Lee, Which Obama-Era 
Rules Are Being Reversed in the Trump Era, NY TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/01/us/politics/trump-obama-regulations-reversed.html.
67. See also MEMORANDUM FOR: REGULATORY POLICY OFFICERS AT EXEC. DEP’TS AND 
AGENCIES AND MANAGING AND EXEC. DIRS. OF CERTAIN AGENCIES AND COMM’NS, supra note 
63, at 5–6. 
68. For details on proposed budget cuts, see President’s Budget, OFFICE OF MGMT. AND 
BUDGET, https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2018).
69. Cf. Public Citizen et al v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00253, (D.D.C. Feb. 8, 2017), 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/Complaint-Public-Citizen-NRDC-CWA-v-Donald-
Trump.pdf (accessed March 6, 2017).
70. Id.
71. INTERIM GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTING SECTION 2 OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER OF JANUARY 
30, 2017, TITLED “REDUCING REGULATION AND CONTROLLING REGULATORY COSTS (Feb. 02, 
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/02/interim-guidance-implementing-
section-2-executive-order-january-30-2017 (accessed March 6, 2017).
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agencies and commissions.72 The initial circulated draft was never 
published in the Federal Register.73
A month later, on March 8, 2017, OMB opened a docket to post 
the draft guidance and the fifty-one comments OMB had received 
on that draft guidance.74 The posted comments represented a 
sampling from academia, industry, and NGOs focusing on envi-
ronmental, public health and regulatory affairs. The table below 
lists stakeholders that submitted comments to docket OMB-2017-
0002.
TABLE 1. COMMENTERS FOR OMB-2017-0002
Category Number Comment Writers
Academia 8 Center for Regulatory Effectiveness
Mercatus Center at George Mason University
Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies
GW Regulatory Studies Center
Center for Food Safety
Yale University
Vassar College
American University
Anonymous 4
Environmental and 
Occupational
5 Earthjustice
Ocean Conservancy
National Council for Occupational Safety and 
Health
Sierra Club Environmental Law Program
Environmental Defense Fund
Industry 15 American Bakers Association
Agri-Pulse Communications
American Forest and Paper Association
Food Marketing Institute
American Petroleum Institute
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association
Policy Navigation Group
Pareto Policy Solutions
Air Permitting Forum
OFW Law
Technosoftdata.com
Shell Exploration & Production Company
Florida Municipal Electric Association
72. Memorandum for: Regulatory Policy Officers at Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies and 
Managing and Exec. Dirs. of Certain Agencies and Comm’ns (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2017/02/02/interim-guidance-implementing-section-2-executive-order-january-
30-2017.
73. Docket ID: OMB-2017-0002, Interim Guidance Implementing Section 2 of Executive Order 
13771, Titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs” (Mar. 8, 2017),
https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=OMB-2017-0002. No instructions on how the public 
could contribute comments accompanied opening of the OMB docket.
74. Id.
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National Association of Home Builders
Commercial Drone Alliance
NGO 9 Union of Concerned Scientists
National Low Income Housing Coalition
Institute of Policy Integrity
Sportsmen’s Alliance Foundation
Regulatory Checkbook
American Council for an Energy-Efficient 
Economy
Public Citizen
Center for Progressive Reform
Sportsmen’s Alliance Foundation
Media 2 National Journal
CNN
Private Citizen 3 US Inventor
Public Health 2 American Heart Association
Healthcare Distribution Alliance
Government 2 County of Santa Clara
Better Regulation Unit, Germany
While most comments came from industry, there was sizable 
representation from a wide variety of groups, such as media, public 
health organizations, environmental groups, and other NGOs. The 
chart below depicts the distribution of comments by type of group 
as of August 6, 2018:
GRAPH 4. WHO MADE COMMENTS TO OMB-2017-0002 DOCKET?
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The guidance was greeted with skepticism from public health 
and environmental groups who feared that deregulation would 
jeopardize public health and safety. For example, Andrew Rosen-
berg of the Union of Concerned Scientists said,
OIRA’s interim guidance attempts to find a way to imple-
ment an unlawful order from the Trump administration 
that will derail much of the important work being done at 
our federal agencies to protect the air we breathe, water we 
drink, food we eat, and environment we inhabit.75
According to Rosenberg, “the executive order also relies heavily on 
using cost-benefit analysis that favors the inclusion of costs to the 
regulated industry without a fair consideration of the social costs of 
removing a particular regulation.”76
Environmental groups also objected to both the executive order 
and efforts to implement it. For example, the Sierra Club asserted 
that both the Executive Order and the Interim Guidance were un-
lawful and arbitrary and, hence, should be rescinded.77 The Sierra 
Club argued that the President
lack[ed] the authority to overrule the will of Congress—as 
expressed in the numerous statutes directing agencies to 
engage in regulation—by directing agencies to repeal ex-
isting regulations every time an agency proposes to prom-
ulgate a new regulation.”78
The Sierra Club further argued that the President “lack[ed] the 
authority to overrule the will of Congress by imposing a cost net-
ting requirement across regulations that lacks any basis in stat-
ute.”79 Since the final guidance seeks to effectuate, as it argued, an 
75. Union of Concerned Scientists, Comment on Interim Guidance Implementing Sec-
tion 2 of the Executive Order of January 30, 2017, Titled “Reducing Regulation and Con-
trolling Regulatory Costs” at 4 (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=
OMB-2017-0002-0041.
76. Id. at 3.
77. Sierra Club, Comment on Interim Guidance Implementing Section 2 of the Execu-
tive Order of January 30, 2017, Titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory 
Costs” at 4 (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OMB-2017-0002-
0015. (“Agency regulation is a cornerstone of modern society. Regulations improve the 
quality of our lives by promoting public safety, protecting public health, safeguarding con-
sumer interests, and improving environment quality. They can be promulgated only where
authorized by statute. They undergo rigorous public review and, where consistent with their
legislative authorization, cost-consideration by OMB prior to promulgation, creating net
positive benefits to society. The Executive Order ignores these realities, instead focusing
exclusively and arbitrarily on the costs they impose.”).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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unlawful executive order, the Sierra Club concluded that the guid-
ance was also unlawful and arbitrary and should be rescinded.80
Public health organizations largely echoed the concerns of envi-
ronmental groups. For example, the American Heart Association, 
the American Lung Association, and the American Public Health 
Association submitted a joint comment stating that “improving the
system is a commendable goal, but, unfortunately, the Executive
Order misses that mark by a wide margin.”81 The chief concern 
raised by public health groups was that federal agencies would be 
required to eliminate regulations, even if the regulations identified 
for repeal included ongoing lifesaving, disease-preventing public 
health protections.82 The public health groups also worried that 
E.O. 13771 could prevent agencies from issuing important, new 
disease-preventing, lifesaving protections if agencies could not
identify deregulatory actions that would fully offset costs to busi-
ness.83 Finally, the health groups indicated alarm that the executive 
order would add significant additional delays in the already 
lengthy and cumbersome regulatory process.84 Thus, public health 
groups also urged the Trump administration to revoke both Exec-
utive Order 13771 and all implementing guidance.85
On the other hand, as indicated above, industry generally sup-
ported both E.O. 13771 and other deregulation efforts by the 
80. Id.
81. American Heart Association, the American Lung Association and the American Pub-
lic Health Association, Comment on Interim Guidance Implementing Section 2 of the Execu-
tive Order of January 30, 2017, Titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory 
Costs” at 1 (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OMB-2017-0002-
0025.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The group explained:
An efficient and effective regulatory system remains critical to enforc-
ing the laws the Congress put in place to safeguard health. These laws, includ-
ing the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act and the Tobacco Control Act, must
have regulations in place to ensure that the intentions of Congress to protect
the nation’s health can be met . . . .
Our organizations are very troubled that this Executive Order ignores the
public health and other benefits that come from federal rulemaking. Many of
these regulations would eliminate or greatly reduce on䇲 going costs to human
health and society, including premature deaths, medical care, hospital stays, on-
set of diseases and days missed at work and school. These regulations provide
very real, measurable economic benefits to our nation’s public health that his-
torically far outweigh the costs . . . .
In addition, the Executive Order overlooks that major rules undergo a thor-
ough cost䇲 benefit analysis before they are finalized. Those are required un-
der Executive Order 12866 and Executive Order 13563. Analyses from ad-
ministrations of both political parties have consistently found far greater
economic benefits from federal regulations than compliance costs.
85. Id.
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Trump administration. Industry sentiment uniformly argued 
that, over the years, regulations had multiplied exponentially and 
that it was expensive and difficult to understand, let alone com-
ply with, all the requirements necessary to stay in business.86 Still, 
however, industry comments were not unbridled in support of 
the two-for-one plan. For example, Shell Exploration & Produc-
tion Company began its comment by welcoming “the acknowl-
edgement that the U.S. regulatory state has reached a point which 
requires attention.”87 Shell stated that
While many regulations and regulatory structures are nec-
essary and add value to the economy, these mechanisms 
can risk misuse and misapplication wherever administrative 
agencies impose major costs upon the economy without 
properly justifying such action or even considering the 
costs, burdens, and unintended consequences.”88
Shell pointed out that many American presidents had made efforts 
to simplify regulations and make regulations more user-friendly to 
industry.89 Shell’s opinion was that prior efforts did not work be-
cause the government had not applied deregulatory dictates across 
all agencies.90
Notwithstanding the general tenor of approval, Shell stated 
certain concerns with E.O. 13771 as a directive. Shell advocated that 
E.O. 13771 should not include regulations, guidance, or policy 
statements clarifying, streamlining, or imposing de minimis or no 
direct and indirect costs on regulated industry because such 
“economically beneficial efforts must not be unintentionally
frustrated.”91 Shell went on to say “careful consideration must be
given when deciding how and whether to apply the [E.O.] to
‘enabling’ regulation,”92 which Shell defined as a regulatory action
or interpretive document needed before industry can begin 
compliance.93 The company explained that since the economic 
baseline for the activity is zero absent enabling regulations, “there 
will be cases where even though the regulation imposes costs, the 
net gains to society would necessarily eclipse those costs since the 
86. See, e.g., Shell, Comment on Interim Guidance Implementing Section 2 of the Ex-
ecutive Order of January 30, 2017, Titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory 
Costs” (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OMB-2017-0002-0050.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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enabling regulation would be the mechanism that allows the 
activity to occur.”94 In such cases, Shell suggested that “enabling 
regulation should simply be subjected to Executive Order 12866
to ensure such net gains are realized, and, more importantly, to
ensure the least burdensome and most narrowly tailored enabling
regulatory action is selected.”95
Shell concluded its comment with the suggestion that OIRA
should commit to a review of E.O. 13771 one year from implemen-
tation “to consider any unintended consequences and to seek
comment from impacted and benefited entities.”96 Shell charged 
that in its one year review of E.O. 13771, “OIRA should evaluate 
the relative efficacy and functionality, as intended versus applied, 
of the cost and burden reduction effort.”97 The company suggested 
that the review “should allow OIRA to make refinements that
guard against additional unintended consequences to improve
the overall effectiveness of the effort to reduce regulatory bur-
dens.”98
Shell’s suggestion to conduct a one year review of the unintend-
ed effects of E.O. 137771 is well founded. While there is general 
agreement amongst industry that regulations—and environmental 
regulations in particular—are overly complicated and that compli-
ance can be unreasonably expensive, there was also general agree-
ment amongst commenting individuals that environmental regula-
tion by EPA is important to protect environmental determinants of 
health. Moreover, regulation provides a certain stability and uni-
form playing field for business. Without regulation, industry is more 
open to tort liability. Regulation can provide a “permit shield” from 
tort liability.99 That shield is particularly beneficial to large industry 
who, by virtue of deep pockets, are more vulnerable to lawsuits. 
Regulation often levels the playing field by requiring all industry—
94. Id.
95. Id. E.O. 12866, entitled “Regulatory Planning and Review,” was issued by President 
Clinton on September 30, 1993. 58 Fed. Reg. 51,785. The order:
• Established the process for OIRA to review agency draft and proposed final 
regulatory actions;
• Defined “significant regulatory actions;”
• Mandated that OIRA conduct a review before those took effect;
• Required an analysis of the costs and benefits of proposed rules; and
• Allowed action only when benefits justify the costs.
96. See supra note 77.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. For a discussion of permit shields see Douglas Henderson et al., “The Clean Water Act 
Permit Shield-Recent Battles” 29 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 56 (2014); Stephanie Rich, “Troubled 
Water: An Examination of the NPDES Permit Shield,” 33 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 250 (2015).
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whether large or small—to comply with basic environmental rules 
that protect both human health and the natural environment.
V. E.O.13777: TASK FORCES AND 
REGULATORY REFORM OFFICERS (RRO)
On February 24, 2017, Trump signed E.O. 13777, which ex-
plained the enforcement mechanism for E.O. 13771.100 E.O. 13777 
gave federal agencies sixty days to designate an agency official as its 
“Regulatory Reform Officer” (RRO) to oversee the implementa-
tion of President Trump’s regulatory reform initiatives.101 The ap-
pointed RRO was required to make periodic reports on means to 
terminate agency programs and activities as a result of the regula-
tory review.102
Federal agencies were also directed to create a Regulatory Re-
form Task Force to be chaired by the agency RRO.103 The Task 
Force had ninety days to evaluate and present a report on existing 
regulations, as well as make recommendations on regulations and 
programs to be repealed, replaced, or modified.104 In particular, 
the Task Force was required to identify regulations that:
• Eliminate jobs or inhibit job creation;
• Are outdated, unnecessary, or ineffective;
• Impose costs that exceed benefits;
• Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere 
with Trump administration regulatory reform initia-
tives and policies;
• Rely in whole or in part on data, information, or 
methods that are not publicly available or that are in-
sufficiently transparent to meet the standard for re-
producibility; or
• Derive from or implement Executive Orders or other 
presidential directives that the Trump administration 
rescinded or substantially modified.105
Pursuant to E.O. 13777, the priority for each federal agency 
Task Force was identifying outdated, unnecessary, or ineffective 
100. Exec. Order No. 13777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 82 Fed. Reg. at 12,285–86. The Director of OMB can waive provisions of E.O. 13776 
as they apply to any federal agency but OMB must publish a list of waived agencies every 
three months. Id. at 12,286.
104. Id. at 12,286.
105. Id.
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regulation.106 Task Forces were directed to seek input and assis-
tance from entities significantly affected by Federal regulations. Af-
fected stakeholders were defined as including state, local, and trib-
al governments; small businesses; consumers; non-governmental 
organizations; and trade associations.107
In response to E.O. 13777, federal agencies established dockets 
seeking public comment of their respective regulatory reform task 
forces throughout 2017. The chart below depicts the activity in the 
respective agency dockets.
TABLE 2. DOCKETS ESTABLISHED FOR PUBLIC COMMENT IN 2017
Date Agency Docket Comments 
Received
Comments 
Posted
3/17 Department of 
Commerce
DOC-2017-0001 176 171
5/17 Environmental 
Protection Agency
EPA-HQ-OA-2017-
0190
468,503 63,422
6/17 Department of 
Interior
DOI-2017-0003 233 233
6/17 U.S. Coast Guard USCG-2017-0480-
0001
222 152
6/17 Department of Justice DOJ-OLP-2017-
0007-0001
31 31
6/17 Department of 
Education
ED-2017-OS-0074-
0001
16,489 16,464
6/17 Federal Emergency 
Management 
Administration 
FEMA-2017-0023 25 24
7/17 U.S. Department of 
Agriculture
USDA-2017-0002 288 284
7/17 National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric 
Administration
NOAA-NMFS-2017-
0067
7,800 168
7/17 National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric 
Administration
NOAA-NMFS-2017-
0054-0001
10 8
7/17 Department of Energy DOE-HQ-2017-0016 54 54
7/17 Army Corps of 
Engineers
COE-2017-0004-
0001
184 158
8/17 U.S. Department of 
State
DOS-2017-0030-
0001
9 9
9/17 United States Customs 
and Border Protection
USCBP-2017-0035 74 64
106. Id.
107. Id.
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9/17 Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation
PBGC-2017-0009 40 40
10/17 Department of Trans-
portation
DOT-OST-2017-
0069-0001
2,836 2,838
10/17 Department of 
Defense
DOD-2017-OS-0059 65 58
11/17 National Credit Union 
Administration
NCUA-2017-0032-
0001
0 0
12/17 General Services 
Administration
GSA-GSA-2017-
0002
264 255
While most dockets opened by federal agencies concerning the
created Task Forces received between about 10 and 250 comments, 
public interest in efforts to deregulate the environment was greater 
than any other regulatory arena. EPA received dramatically more 
public comments concerning its Task Force than any other agency.
EPA reported receiving 468,503 public comments, of which 63,422 
were posted to the EPA RRO docket. The difference was attributa-
ble to mass mailing campaigns—mostly from environmental 
NGOs. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), which among other things tracks evidence and the im-
pact of climate change, was also the subject of mass mailing cam-
paigns. NOAA received 7,800 comments, of which 168 were post-
ed. The only other department receiving vigorous public 
participation was the Department of Education, receiving 16,489 
public comments.
VI. E.O. 13778:
REPEAL AND REPLACEMENT OF WOTUS
There has been debate for many years over the extent to which 
EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers can regulate activities in 
wetlands pursuant to the Clean Water Act.108 In 2015, the Obama 
administration sought to resolve the debate by promulgating the 
“Waters of the United States” Rule.109 The WOTUS Rule was an 
important polarizing point of debate during the 2016 presidential 
campaign.110
108. For a historical discussion, see Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, Regulation of Non-
Adjacent Wetlands Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 23 NEW ENG. L. REV. 615 (1988).
109. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 
(June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, scattered parts of  40 C.F.R.).
110. See Elizabeth Glass Geltman, The New Anti-Federalism: Late Term Obama Environmental 
Regulations and the Rise of Trump, 93 N.D. L. Rev. 243 (2018).
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On February 28, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 
13778, entitled “Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Eco-
nomic Growth by Reviewing the ‘Waters of the United States’ 
(‘WOTUS’) Rule.”111 In E.O. 13778, President Trump declared that
it is in the national interest to ensure that the Nation’s nav-
igable waters are kept free from pollution, while at the 
same time promoting economic growth, minimizing regu-
latory uncertainty, and showing due regard for the roles of 
the Congress and the States under the Constitution.112
Accordingly, the President dictated review of the final Obama-era 
WOTUS Rule113 promulgated jointly by the U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers and EPA. After review and consultation, the two agencies 
were instructed to publish a proposed rule either rescinding or re-
vising the WOTUS rule.114
Following this directive, on March 6, 2017, EPA published a no-
tice of intention to review and rescind or revise the Clean Water 
Rule (CWA) in the Federal Register,115 consistent with President 
Trump’s executive orders E.O. 13771, E.O. 13777, and E.O. 
13778.116 The notice marked the beginning of a formal rulemaking 
proceeding because “[i]t is important that stakeholders and the 
public at large have certainty as to how the CWA applies to their 
activities.”117
From a legal point of view, E.O. 13778 and the accompanying 
EPA notice are significant since they carve out the principle that 
“[a]gencies have inherent authority to reconsider past decisions 
and to revise, replace or repeal a decision to the extent permitted 
by law and supported by a reasoned explanation.”118 The Trump 
administration explained that “a revised decision need not be 
based upon a change of facts or circumstances.”119 Rather, revised 
rulemakings can be based “on a reevaluation of which policy would 
111. Exec. Order No. 13778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017).
112. Id.
113. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054 
(June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.).
114. Exec. Order No. 13778.
115. Intention to Review and Rescind or Revise the Clean Water Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 
12,532 (Mar. 6, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. (first citing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); then 
citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29, 42 (1983)).
119. Notice of Intent, 82 Fed. Reg. at 12,532.
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be better in light of the facts.”120 Such revisions, the Trump admin-
istration asserted, were “well within an agency’s discretion.”121
Moreover, the Trump administration’s WOTUS proposal posited 
that “[a] change in administration brought about by the people 
casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive 
agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and 
regulations.”122
On June 27, 2017, the Army Corps of Engineers and EPA issued 
a pre-publication version of the new Trump administration version 
of the WOTUS Rule and established Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-
2017-0203 on Regulations.gov to collect public comments during a
thirty-day comment period.123 After objection, the initial thirty-day 
comment period was extended.124 The WOTUS docket closed on 
September 27, 2017. On September 28, 2017, EPA reported that 
they received 206,473 comments, 9,703 of which were posted on 
the docket.125 The difference was attributable to mass mailings with 
duplicative content. Most of the comments contained only a few 
lines or paragraphs, and almost none cited any legal or scientific 
authority for the commenters’ assertions.
EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers proposed a second 
WOTUS Rule on November 16, 2017, that would delay the effec-
tive date of the WOTUS Rule promulgated by the Obama Admin-
istration until at least 2020.126 Although the initial Obama admin-
istration’s WOTUS Rule was meant to take effect on August 28, 
2015, the rule was stayed in thirteen states by a North Dakota dis-
trict court. A Sixth Circuit order expanded the stay 
wide.127 Ten states (New York, Massachusetts, California, Hawaii, 
120. Id. (citing National Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1038, 1043 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012)).
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Home Builders, 682 F.3d at 1043 (citing State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
123. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 
82 Fed. Reg. 34,899 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, scattered 
parts of 40 C.F.R.).
124. See Definition of “Waters of the United States” – Pre-Proposal Outreach Comments,
REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2017-0480
(“Comment Period Closed Nov. 28, 2017 11:59 PM ET”).
125. The difference of 206,473 comments was attributed to duplicate content from sixty-
one different mass mail campaigns. The agency does not report how many duplicates corre-
sponded with which campaigns. Most of the comments found in the docket were from pri-
vate citizens. Four thousand and eighty-seven comments were signed and another 5,179 
were submitted anonymously.
126. See Press Release, EPA, EPA and the Army Propose to Amend the Effective Date of 
the 2015 Rule Defining “Waters of the United States,” (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.epa.
gov/newsreleases/epa-and-army-propose-amend-effective-date-2015-rule-defining-waters-
united-states.
127. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 
2015 Clean Water Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 55542 (proposed Nov. 22, 2017) (to be codified at 33 
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Maine, Maryland, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washing-
ton) and the District of Columbia objected to the proposed further 
delay in WOTUS implementation in comments during the 2017 
comment period.128
Public participation in the second phase of the Trump admin-
istration’s efforts to dismantle the WOTUS Rule was less robust
than during the first announcement that the rule would be revised 
or rescinded. While about 9,703 comments were posted in phase 
one, only about 702 comments were posted in the second phase. 
Whereas sixty-one mass-mailing campaigns were organized in the 
first notice and comment period, only eight groups mobilized to 
address the second proposal: Brewers for Clean Water, 350 Con-
necticut et al., Physicians for Social Responsibility, Clean Water Ac-
tion, and four anonymous groups. The chart below compares the 
level and distribution of public response to the two Trump admin-
istration proposals to revise or repeal WOTUS:
GRAPH 5. COMMENTS FILED DURING NOTICE AND COMMENT FOR 
THE PROPOSED WOTUS RULES
In January 2018, the Supreme Court held that challenges to the 
WOTUS Rule must be filed in federal district courts,129 which fur-
C.F.R. pt. 328 scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.); see generally Waters of the U.S. Rule, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/resources/
wotus/wotus-rule.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2018).
128. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, New York et al., Comment Letter on EPA 
Proposed Rule: Definition of Waters of the United States-Addition of Applicability Date to 
2015 Clean Water Rule (Dec. 13, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/2017_03_
31_petition_and_rules_final.pdf.
129. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617 (2018).
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ther confused the status of EPA regulation of wetlands—the sub-
ject of the WOTUS Rule. On February 6, 2018, the Trump admin-
istration added an applicability date to the Obama administration’s 
2015 WOTUS Rule declaring that the WOTUS Rule will not be 
implemented until February 6, 2020.130 Five months later, on July 
12, 2018, the Trump administration announced intent to repeal 
the 2015 WOTUS Rule completely and restore the definition of 
“waters of the United States” that existed prior to August 25, 
2015.131 On July 27, 2018132 EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers 
clarified that that the proposed Trump administration definition 
of “waters of the United States” would exclude prior converted 
cropland and waste treatment systems.133 The summer 2018 pro-
posal also clarified that the proposed definition would not restrict 
“the ability of States to protect waters within their boundaries by 
defining the scope of waters regulated under State law more 
broadly than the federal law definition.”134 The comment period 
closed on the latest proposal for the WOTUS Rule in docket EPA-
HQ-OW-2017-0203-15104 and COE-2017-0005-0004 on August 13, 
2018.  On August 16, 2018, the U.S. District Court of South Caroli-
na held that the Trump administration violated the Administrative 
Procedures Act when it suspended the effective date of WOTUS 
rule for two years.135
VII. E.O.13783: PROMOTING ENERGY POLICY
President Trump issued E.O.13783, entitled “Promoting Energy 
Independence and Economic Growth,” on March 28, 2017.136 Pur-
suant to E.O. 13783, EPA began reviewing the Clean Power Plan 
on April 4, 2017.137 On October 16, 2017, EPA announced repeal 
of the Clean Power Plan on the grounds that the regulation ex-
130. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5,200 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 
328, scattered parts of 40 C.F.R.).
131. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 
Fed. Reg. 32,227 (July 12, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328, scattered parts of 40 
C.F.R.).
132. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rules, 82 
Fed. Reg. 34,899 (July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 328, scattered parts of 40 
C.F.R.).
133. Id. at 34,902.
134. Id.
135. S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, No. 2-18-cv-330-DCN (D.S.C. Aug. 16, 
2018), https://casetext.com/case/sc-coastal-conservation-league-v-pruitt. 
136. Proclamation No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017).
137. Announcement of Review, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,329 (Apr. 4, 2017).
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ceeds the statutory authority of section 111 of the Clean Air Act.138
EPA established docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355 to allow public 
comment on the repeal.139 Comments were initially due on De-
cember 15, 2017, but the commenting period was extended twice 
following public request.
EPA reported that, as of April 10, 2018, there were 566,978 
comments about the Clean Air Act repeal.140 Of those, 547,676 
were the product of about ninety-three mass mailing campaigns. 
The sources of these campaigns were not always identified to EPA, 
but organizers included the American Lung Association,141
Care2,142 Environmental Defense Fund (EDF),143 Empower Ken-
tucky,144 Physicians for Social Responsibility, League of Conserva-
tion Voters (LCV),145 National Parks Conservation Association 
(NPCA),146 National Wildlife Federation (NWF),147 World Wildlife 
Fund.148 Each of these groups strongly opposed repealing the 
Clean Power Plan, expressed support for EPA efforts to regulate 
carbon emissions, and supported even stronger regulations to re-
duce the impact of climate change. Comments organized by televi-
sion personality Samantha Bee echoed the concerns of the envi-
ronmentalist and public health campaigns.149
138. Repeal of Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (Oct. 16, 2017).
139. Id.
140. Of those, 5,867 were posted. The balance of 149,988 reflected duplicate mailing 
that were the result of thirty mass mailing campaigns.
141. American Lung Association in California et al., Comments on the Proposed Repeal 
of the Clean Power Plan Hearing (Apr. 30, 2018), http://www.lung.org/local-content/
california/documents/comments-on-the-proposed.pdf.
142. Care2, Sample Comment Letter on the EPA Proposed Rule to Repeal the Clean 
Power Plan (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-
0355-3763.
143. EDF, Sample Comment Letter on the EPA Proposed Rule to Repeal the Clean Pow-
er Plan, https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355-4921 (Dec. 8, 
2017); EDF, Sample Comment Letter on the EPA Proposed Rule to Repeal the Clean Power 
Plan (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355-
4922.
144. Empower Kentucky, Sample Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Repeal the 
Clean Power Plan (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-
2017-0355-4931.
145. LCV, Sample Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Repeal the Clean Power Plan 
(Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355-0173.
146. NPCA, Sample Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Repeal the Clean Power Plan 
(Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355-4930.
147. NWF, Sample Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Repeal the Clean Power Plan 
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355-3860.
148. World Wildlife Fund, Sample Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Repeal the 
Clean Power Plan (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-
2017-0355-4920.
149. Samantha Bee provided a template that read:
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On the other side, comments organized by the Koch-funded150
Americans for Prosperity151 approved of the repeal. For example, 
right-leaning comments posted in the docket read:
I strongly support Administrator Pruitt’s new proposed 
rule, EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355, to effectively repeal the 
Clean Power Plan and help rein in federal overreach by the 
Obama administration in the energy sector.
The CPP is a costly, bureaucratic program that will kill 
jobs and cost Americans billions in energy expenses if left 
in place. Americans like me depend on affordable, reliable, 
[sic] energy. The CPP must be repealed as soon as possible.
Please consider this an official comment for EPA’s rec-
ords.152
Citizen interest in the Clean Power Plan remained robust at the 
behest of thirteen organizing groups. By August 6, 2018, the num-
ber of comments submitted to the Clean Power Plan docket had 
nearly tripled: 1,343,546 comments were submitted, of which 
20,674 were posted. Fifty-eight percent of the 20,674 comments 
posted before August 6, 2018 were anonymous. Of the thirty-seven
percent signed by individuals, most contained very brief statements 
that read more like a vote for or against the proposed regulation 
rather than a legal or scientific reason for the agency to act. Only 
I oppose the repeal of the Clean Power Plan, as well as any other measures
that will loosen its restrictions on pollution. I respectfully request you hold a pub-
lic hearing on the rule change regarding the CPP.
The CPP protects our environment by limiting pollution from power plants,
and in order to live healthy lives, we all require clean air and temperatures that
can sustain our diverse ecosystem.
Please preserve the CPP so we can maintain the natural resources neces-
sary to our health and survival. It will not be possible for our nation to prosper
without a healthy climate.
Letter from Matthew Downing to Scott Pruitt, Director, Environmental Protection Agency 
(Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355-2689;
Samantha Bee, Sample Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Repeal the Clean Power Plan 
(Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355-2689.
See also Full Frontal with Samantha Bee: Hi, Scott Pruitt, This is Our Official Request for a Hearing,
YOUTUBE (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d5UHQQQHhyc (discussing 
the Clean Power Plan and requesting public participation).
150. Laurie Bennett, Tracking Koch Money and Americans for Prosperity, FORBES (Mar. 31, 
2012, 10:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lauriebennett/2012/03/31/tracking-koch-
money-and-americans-for-prosperity.
151. Americans for Prosperity, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule: Repeal of Carbon 
Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating 
Units (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355-
2822.
152. Email from Nicholas Toth to A-AND-R-DOCKET (Nov. 6, 2017), https://
www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OAR-2017-0355-2822.
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one percent (only 299) comments were signed by a company or 
organization; most contained detailed explanations justifying the 
position asserted by the agency. One million, three hundred-
thousand, four hundred and twenty-seven comments were submit-
ted by the general public as part of thirteen mass mail campaigns.
EPA proposed the Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) rule on August 
21, 2018.153 ACE would replace the 2015 Clean Power Plan and es-
tablish emission guidelines for states to develop plans to address 
greenhouse gas emissions from existing coal-fired power plants.154
VIII. OMB FINAL RRO GUIDANCE
On April 6, 2017, OMB posted the final guidance circulated to 
regulatory officers at federal departments, agencies, and commis-
sions to implement E.O. 13771.155 OMB defined “E.O. 13771 regu-
latory action” consistent with past definitions of used to desig-
nate regulation as “significant.”156 OMB determined that it 
would continue using regulatory standards established by Presi-
dent Bill Clinton in E.O. 12866,157 which established that guid-
ance documents could be considered significant regulatory ac-
tion158 if the action would have an annual effect of $100 million 
or more on the economy or a sector of the economy, create a se-
153. Environmental Protection Agency, Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guideline Im-
plementing Regulations, Revisions to New Source Review Program (proposed Aug. 20, 
2018) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2018-08/documents/frn-ace-proposal_8.20.2018.pdf.
154. Id. See also Proposal: Affordable Clean Energy (ACE) Rule, EPA, https://www.epa.
gov/stationary-sources-air-pollution/proposal-affordable-clean-energy-ace-rule (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2018).
155. DOMINIC J. MANCINI, GUIDANCE IMPLEMENTING EXECUTIVE ORDER 13771, TITLED 
“REDUCING REGULATION AND CONTROLLING REGULATORY COSTS” (2017), https://www.
regulations.gov/document?D=OMB-2017-0002-0053.
156. Id. at 3.
157. Id. As a general rule, E.O. 13771 does not change the dictates of E.O. 12866. E.O. 
12866 will remain the primary governing E.O. regarding regulatory review and planning.
Id. OMB explained:
In particular, E.O. 13771 has no effect on the consideration of benefits in in-
forming any regulatory decisions. For all E.O. 13771 regulatory actions and
E.O. 13771 deregulatory actions, except where prohibited by law, agencies
must continue to assess and consider both benefits and costs and comply with
all existing requirements and guidance, including but not limited to those in
E.O. 12866 and OMB Circular A-4.
Id. at 4.
158. Proclamation No. 12866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993), https://www.
archives.gov/files/federal-register/executive-orders/pdf/12866.pdf. For a general discus-
sion of E.O. 12866, see Elizabeth Glass Geltman et al., Impact of Executive Order 13211 on Envi-
ronmental Regulation: An Empirical Study, 89 ENERGY POL’Y 302 (2016).
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rious interagency inconsistency, materially impact entitlement 
programs, or raise novel legal issues or policy.159 But the primary 
criteria for the Trump administration was cost. Finalized rule-
makings are significant pursuant to E.O. 13771 if they “impose to-
tal costs greater than zero.”160
Since the essence of the Trump administration’s two-for-one 
deregulation is costs, OMB defined an “[E.O.] 13771 deregula-
tory action” as a federal agency action that is cost-neutral to indus-
try. OMB expanded the concept of deregulatory actions beyond 
that used by the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations in E.O. 
12866 and OMB’s Final Bulletin on Good Guidance Practice. 161 De-
regulatory actions are evaluated by the Trump administration 
both to satisfy the provision to remove at least two existing regu-
lations for each regulation issued and to evaluate the degree to 
which the action meets the total incremental cost allowance as it 
applies to industry.162
Deregulatory actions can take any form as long as they re-
duce costs to the regulated industry. They can be informally or
formally negotiated rulemaking, guidance documents, or infor-
mation collection requests that repeal or streamline recordkeep-
ing, reporting, or disclosure requirements.163 OMB was clear that,
in deciding which regulations to repeal, federal agencies should 
look to data collected from each agency’s Regulatory Reform Task
Force.164 Federal agencies should consider and prioritize sugges-
tions raised by stakeholders—especially those significantly affected
by Federal regulations.165 The Trump administration explained 
that agencies should prioritize deregulating where regulations 
eliminate jobs, inhibit job creation, are outdated, unnecessary, in-
effective, impose costs that exceed benefits, are inconsistent, inter-
fere with regulatory reform initiatives and policies, are inconsistent 
with federal appropriations, or are based on past Presidential di-
rectives or executive orders that President Trump repealed or 
modified.166 Moreover, the deregulatory plan demanded prioritiz-
ing deregulatory actions that affect the same industry or locality—
especially where the costs are likely to be incurred disproportion-
ately by a certain industry or locality.167
159. Id.
160. MANCINI, supra note 155. 
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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Under the new Trump administration formula for cost-
benefit analysis, costs would continue to be estimated using the
methods and concepts in OMB Circular A-4.168 So “if medical 
cost savings due to safety regulations have historically been cate-
gorized as benefits rather than reduced costs, they should con-
tinue to be categorized as benefits for [E.O.] 13771 regulatory
actions.”169 A special carveout was, thus, created for medical cost 
savings depending on whether they had historically been charac-
terized as benefits to society or as reduced costs. Only in the case 
where medical cost savings had been calculated by OMB as a cost 
saving measure would such costs be included in the regulatory re-
form formula articulated by the Trump administration. When cal-
culating cost savings, “only those impacts that have been tradi-
tionally estimated as costs when taking a regulatory action
should be counted as cost savings when taking an [E.O.] 13771
deregulatory action.”170 Federal agencies can, however, bank de-
regulatory actions and cost saving within a year.171
OMB determined that all the Obama-era rules that the Trump 
administration withdraws qualify as E.O. 13771 repeal actions.
Withdrawal of Obama regulations would not, however, qualify for
the cost savings component of E.O. 13771, because industry had 
not incurred any costs as a result of the new Obama-era regulations 
since the rules had not yet been implemented or become effec-
tive.172 OIRA stated that it would consider whether Obama-era ac-
tions vacated by a court would qualify as an E.O. 13771 deregulato-
ry action on a case-by-case basis.173
OMB confirmed that E.O. 13771 does not apply to independent 
regulatory agencies, but encouraged the independent bodies to 
comply with the spirit of E.O. 13771.174 Other federal agencies must 
submit exemption requests to OIRA prior to submitting exempt 
regulatory action to OMB for E.O. 12866 review or prior to publi-
cation (if the action was not subject to E.O. 12866 review).175
168. Id.
169. Id. The agency said, “Identifying cost savings, such as fuel savings associated with
energy efficiency investments, as benefits is a common accounting convention followed
in OIRA’s reports to Congress on the benefits and costs of Federal regulations.”
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. Exempt regulations include, but are not limited, to:
• expressly exempt actions;
• emergency actions;
• statutorily or judicially required actions; and
• de minimis actions.
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OMB stated that, as a general rule, E.O. 13771 would not 
change the dictates of the Clinton administration’s E.O. 12866, 
and E.O. 12866 would remain the primary mechanism governing 
OMB regulatory review and planning.176 OMB clarified that fed-
eral agencies should use best efforts to monetize both the effects of 
regulatory actions and deregulatory actions.177 The bottom line is 
that, pursuant to E.O. 13771, each year agencies should have is-
sued at least twice the number of deregulatory actions as new regu-
lations. Just as significantly, the cost to industry of new regulations 
should be offset by deregulation.178 Since any new regulation 
would require two deregulatory actions, OIRA will have substantial 
additional work. Hence, OMB warned that agencies must leave suf-
ficient time for OIRA to complete E.O. 12866 review when under-
taking regulatory and deregulatory actions.179
IX. EPA REGULATORY REFORM DOCKET
The Trump campaign consistently cited EPA as a dramatic ex-
ample of the need for regulatory reform during the 2016 elec-
tion.180 EPA, under Scott Pruitt, began the deregulatory process 
quickly. EPA created a regulatory reform task force pursuant to 
E.O. 13777,181 and, on April 13, 2017, the Agency opened a docket 
allowing about a month for public comment on “regulations that 
may be appropriate for repeal, replacement, or modification.”182
Response to EPA’s request was robust, despite the short time al-
lowed to file a comment.
This Part again used established principles of legal epidemiology 
to conduct policy surveillance.183 The docket was indexed using the 
176. Id.
177. Id.; see also OMB Circular A-4.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. For a detailed discussion, see Elizabeth Glass Geltman, The New Anti-Federalism: Late 
Term Obama Environmental Regulations and the Rise of Trump, 93 N.D. L. REV. 243 (2018).
181. 82 Fed. Reg. 17,793 (April 13, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=EPA-
HQ-OA-2017-0190; see also SCOTT PRUIT, MEMORANDUM ON EXECUTIVE ORDER: ENFORCING 
THE REGULATORY REFORM AGENDA (2017), https://www.epa.gov/laws-regulations/memorandum-
executive-order-13777-enforcing-regulatory-reform-agenda.
182. 82 Fed. Reg. 17,793 (April 13, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=EPA-
HQ-OA-2017-0190.
183. For an explanation of how to conduct policy surveillance using principles of legal 
epidemiology, see David Presley, Thomas Reinstein, & Scott Burris, Resources for Policy 
Surveillance: A Report Prepared for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Public 
Health Law Program, SSRN 2567695 (2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2567695; David Presley & Scott Burris, A Scan of Existing 50 State Survey and 
Policy Surveillance Resources, SSRN 2523011 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2523011; David Presley, et al., Creating Legal Data for Public Health 
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docket identification number assigned on Regulations.gov. Coders 
divided and evaluated the docket and then reviewed each other’s 
work. The naïve coder selected random comments to be sure of 
agreement.184 CAQDAS allowed auto-coding of key words and syn-
onyms as a crosscheck. Once complete, the results were analyzed to 
identify patterns and themes.
As of June 10, 2017, the EPA docket had received 381,204 com-
ments, 46,084 of which were posted publicly. The difference re-
flected duplicate or near-duplicate filings from mass mail cam-
paigns. The table below provides a breakdown of who filed 
comments in EPA regulatory reform docket.
Monitoring and Evaluation: Delphi Standards for Policy Surveillance, J. OF L., MEDICINE &
ETHICS, 2015, at 27–31; Scott Burris, A Technical Guide for Policy Surveillance, Temple 
University Legal Studies Research Paper, 2014-34 (2014); Sarah Happy, Technical Standards 
for Policy Surveillance: Delphi Process and Technical Guide, 142nd APHA Annual Meeting 
and Exposition (Nov. 15–19, 2014), https://apha.confex.com/apha/142am/webprogram/
Paper309688.html.
For other applications, see Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Shipping Fracking Wastes on the 
Ohio River: A Case Study in Effective Public Advocacy and How Citizen Groups Can Do 
Even Better. 10(5) Envtl. Justice 137-153(2017); Elizabeth Glass Geltman, et al., Inquiry into 
the Impact of Bush’s Executive Order 13211 on Environmental and Public Health Regula-
tion, 28 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 200 (2016); Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Gunwant Gill, & Miriam 
Jovanovic, Impact of Executive Order 13211 on Environmental Regulation: An Empirical 
Study, Energy Policy, 2016, at 302–310; Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Gunwant Gill, and Miriam 
Jovanovic., Beyond baby steps: An empirical study of the impact of environmental justice 
executive order 12898. 39(3) Family & community health 143-150 (2016); Elizabeth Glass 
Geltman, Regulation of Technologically Enhanced Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materi-
als (TENORM) under State Law: How Effective Is it? What More Needs to Be Done?, 143rd 
APHA Annual Meeting and Exposition (October 31–November 4, 2015); Elizabeth Glass 
Geltman, 21 Years Later: Has Executive Order 12898 (entitled Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations) Worked?, 
143rd APHA Annual Meeting and Exposition (October 31–November 4, 2015); Elizabeth 
Glass Geltman, Policy Surveillance on the Impact of Bush’s Executive Order 13211 (Requir-
ing Preparation of a Statement of Energy Effects as a Condition to Federal Action) on Envi-
ronmental and Public Health Policy, 143rd APHA Annual Meeting and Exposition (October 
31–November 4, 2015).
184. For an explanation of the methods used to develop codes and conduct coding, see 
David Presley, et al., Creating Legal Data for Public Health Monitoring and Evaluation: Delphi 
Standards for Policy Surveillance, 43 J. OF L., MEDICINE & ETHICS 27 (2015); Scott C. Burris & 
Evan D. Anderson, Legal Regulation of Health-Related Behavior: A Half-Century of Public Health 
Law Research, ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCIENCE no. 2013-19 (2013); Scott C. Burris, et al., Moving 
from Intersection to Integration: Public Health Law Research and Public Health Systems and Services 
Research, 90 MILBANK Q. 375 (2012); Evan D. Anderson, et al., Measuring Statutory Law and 
Regulations for Empirical Research, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 28 (2012); Jennifer K. Ibrahim, et al., 
Public Health Law Research: Exploring Law in Public Health Systems, 18 J. OF PUB. HEALTH MGMT.
AND PRAC. 409 (2012); Scott C. Burris & Evan D. Anderson, Making the Case for Laws that Im-
prove Health: The Work of the Public Health Law Research National Program Office, 39 J. OF L.,
MED. & ETHICS 15 (2011); Scott C. Burris, Law in a Social Determinants Strategy: A Public Health 
Law Research Perspective, 126 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 22 (2011). See also Evan D. Anderson & Scott 
C. Burris., Educated Guessing: Getting Researchers and Research Knowledge into Policy Innovation,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2412499 in REGULATING TOBACCO,
ALCOHOL AND UNHEALTHY FOODS 36 (Tania Voon et al. eds., 1st ed. 2014).
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TABLE 3. COMMENTERS ON EPA-HQ-OA-2017-0190
EPA-HQ-OA-2017-0190
Comment Writers Number of Comments
Mass Mail Campaign
54 comments filed with 
335,120 signatures/duplicates
Company/Organization 646
Tribal Government 29
Federal Government 11
State Government 33
Anonymous Public Comments 38,587
Signed Individual Public 
Comments 5,723
Certain themes were consistent in the comments. Over a third of 
the comments discussed the need to continue to protect public 
health and the environment and were concerned that deregulation 
efforts in EPA-administered programs might put both in jeopardy. 
Fifteen percent of commenters couched this concern in terms of 
protecting children, and twelve percent raised concerns about pro-
tecting future generations. From a substantive standpoint, fourteen 
percent of the comments addressed concerns about regulating air 
pollution, and twelve percent flagged protection from water pollu-
tion as a priority.
One percent of the comments, mostly from industry, discussed 
issues of permitting. The most common candidate for proposed 
deregulation was the Clean Air Act (seven percent), followed by 
the Clean Water Act (six percent). Although not a permit program 
but a cleanup program, Superfund185 was the next most-cited EPA 
program that was identified as in need of simplification (one per-
cent). The graph below identifies the most prominent themes re-
flected in the public comments concerning EPA regulatory reform.
185. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 
42 USC §§ 9601–9675 (1980).
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GRAPH 6. PUBLIC COMMENT THEMES IN
EPA-HQ-OA-2017-0190-2
Interest in the EPA reform efforts in docket EPA-HQ-OA-2017-
0190 remained robust beyond the comments period. A tad over a 
year later, as of August 7, 2018, the docket had received 468,503
comments (up from 381,204), of which 63,422 comments (up from 
46,084) had been posted. The themes arising from the EPA RRO 
docket, however, looked different than some of the earlier com-
ments. While industry still heavily focused on environmental per-
mitting as a problem, they constituted only one percent of all the 
comments submitted. Dramatically more citizens submitting com-
ments to EPA were concerned about reducing air and water pollu-
tion and protecting human health and the environment both now 
and for generations to come.
X. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR REGULATORY REFORM DOCKET
On June 22, 2017, the Department of Interior posted a parallel 
docket requesting public input on regulatory reform needed for 
DOI-administered rules and regulation.186 The DOI docket gave 
186. 82 Fed. Reg. 28,429 (June 22, 2017). See also Secretary’s Order No. 3349, AMERICAN 
ENERGY INDEPENDENCE (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/
uploads/so_3349_-american_energy_independence.pdf.
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the public the first formal opportunity to comment on Secretary of 
the Interior Ryan Zinke’s March 29, 2017, Order No. 3349.187 In 
that Order, Secretary Zinke asked for review of mitigation policies, 
climate change policies, the BLM fracking rule,188 the BLM flaring 
rule,189 the National Park Service rule regulating fracking in na-
tional parks,190 and the Fish and Wildlife Service rule regulating 
fracking in national wildlife refuges.191 Secretary Zinke also asked 
for a report identifying any rules that “potentially burdened [a
term defined in the March 28, 2017, E.O.] . . . the develop-
ment or utilization of domestically produced energy re-
sources, with particular attention to oil, natural gas, coal, and
nuclear resources.”192
Unlike the vast response to the EPA docket, DOI reported that, 
as of December 14, 2017, only 213 comments were submitted to 
docket number DOI-2017-0003. All were posted.193 Rather than a 
general docket, as EPA had used, DOI requested that the public 
direct comments concerning regulatory reform to specific offices 
within the Agency.194 The breakdown of offices within DOI that re-
ceived comments can be found in the chart below.
187. Secretary’s Order No. 3349, AMERICAN ENERGY INDEPENDENCE (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/so_3349_-american_energy_
independence.pdf.
188. Oil and Gas; Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian Lands, 80 Fed. Reg.
16,128 (Mar. 26, 2015) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 3160). For discussion of the BLM 
fracking rule, see generally Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, Drilling for Common Ground: How 
Public Opinion Tracks Experts in the Debate over Federal Regulation of Shale Oil & Gas Extraction,
35 VA. ENVT’L. L.J. 59 (2016).
189. Waste Prevention, Production Subject to Royalties, and Resource Conserva-
tion, 81 Fed. Reg. 83,008 (Jan. 17, 2017) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. pts. 3100, 3160, 
3170).
190. General Provisions and Non-Federal Oil and Gas Rights, 81 Fed. Reg. 77,972
(Nov. 4, 2016) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pts. 1, 9). For commentary on this rule, see
Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Oil & Gas Drilling in National Parks. 56 Nat. Resources J. 145 
(2016).
191. Management of Non-Federal Oil and Gas Rights, 81 Fed. Reg. 79,948 (Nov.
14, 2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 28, 29).
192. Secretary’s Order No. 3349, AMERICAN ENERGY INDEPENDENCE (Mar. 29, 2017), 
https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/so_3349_-american_energy_independence.pdf.
193. Regulatory Reform Executive Order 13777, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://www.
regulations.gov/docket?D=DOI-2017-0003. By August 7, 2018, the number of comments 
submitted to DOI-2017-0003 docket increased to 246. All were posted.
194. 82 Fed. Reg. 28,431.
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GRAPH 7. BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC COMMENTS 
SUBMITTED TO DOI-2017-0003 (N=213)
Industry used the request for regulatory review to address specif-
ic regulations the business community deemed especially cumber-
some.195 For example, ConocoPhillips, the nation’s largest inde-
pendent oil and gas exploration and production company, said it 
was “committed to sustainability, and . . . very proud of [its]work
to help protect ecosystems, foster wildlife habitats, and support
the communities in which [it] operate[s].”196 The energy behe-
moth also said it “recognize[d] the need for regulation and . . . 
support[ed] a stable, consistent regulatory regime based on sound
science and economics.”197 As such, the company said it “d[id] not
advocate for reducing environmental stewardship; however, [it]
believe[d] there [wa]s value in eliminating excessive, duplicative,
195. See, e.g., Letter from Kathleen M. Sgamma, Pres., Western Energy Alliance, to Hon. 
Ryan Zinke, Secretary, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.
regulations.gov/document?D=DOI-2017-0003-0098; see also Letter from Don Harp and Joe 
Marushack, Pres., ConocoPhillips, to Mark Lawyer, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Oct. 30, 
2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOI-2017-0003-0212. 
196. Letter from Don Harp and Joe Marushack, Pres., ConocoPhillips, to Mark Lawyer, 
U.S. Dep’t of the Interior (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=DOI-
2017-0003-0212. 
197. Id.
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and impractical regulations that have a poor benefit-cost value for
the environment and stakeholders.”198 In supporting DOl’s regula-
tory reform efforts, ConocoPhillips submitted an appendix with a 
table containing a laundry list of regulations the company deemed 
overly confusing, time consuming, or difficult, along with a pro-
posed fix for each.199
Environmental groups raised both substantive and procedural 
objections to the Trump administration’s effort at regulatory re-
form.200 For example, the Wilderness Society raised questions about 
the transparency with which the Trump administration made 
changes to rules governing public lands.201 The environmental 
group said,
We are united in our grave concern that any decision taken
under these orders to rescind or revise regulations, policies
and other actions not result in the potential degradation of 
our lands, waters and air, or the enjoyment of our irre-
placeable natural heritage. It has been made clear in recent 
weeks that management of energy development on Ameri-
ca’s public lands is this administration’s primary concern.202
Moreover, the Wilderness Society argued that the Trump admin-
istration was forging a significant change in public land use be-
cause it sought to “create a regulatory framework that establishes
energy development as the ‘dominant’ use of public lands.”203 Envi-
ronmental groups argued that Congress directed the DOI to “im-
plement management actions in furtherance of the public interest, 
not just the economic interest of extractive industries.”204 The or-
ganic statutes for the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Nation-
al Park Service (NPS), United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS), and the United States Forest Service (USFS) require the 
agencies to govern the management of public lands and balance
energy development with preservation of lands for future genera-
tions. No statute allows management “exclusively or primarily for
energy development.” Actions that did not carefully balance energy 
and land preservation would “not only violate applicable law and
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Letter from Nada Culver, Senior Counsel and Senior Dir., The Wilderness Soc’y, 
et al., to Hon. Ryan Zinke, Secretary, Dep’t of the Interior (July 20, 2017), https://www.
regulations.gov/document?D=DOI-2017-0003-0042.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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policy, but also contravene [DOI] collective responsibilities to the 
American people as stewards of their shared heritage.”205
XI.  EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
President Trump ran for office on a platform of regulatory re-
form promising to “drain the swamp.” President Trump argued 
that President Obama had exceeded executive authority and acted 
as an imperial president.206 Yet in his first year in office, President 
Trump signed more executive orders than any other recent presi-
dent, Democrat or Republican. In 2017, Donald Trump signed fif-
ty-five executive orders.207 The graph below depicts the relative 
number of executive orders signed by the last four presidents.
GRAPH 8. EXECUTIVE ORDERS ISSUED IN THE FIRST YER IN OFFICE
205. Id.
206. See, e.g., Dave Boyer, Trump Dismantles Obama’s ‘Imperial’ Presidency, Rescinds Dubious 
Orders, WASHINGTON TIMES (Oct. 16, 2017) https:/www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/
oct/16/donald-trump-reverses-obamas-legally-dubious-execu/; see also Veronique de Rugy, 
Obama’s Imperial Presidency, NATIONAL REVIEW (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.nationalreview.
com/corner/443799/obamas-imperial-presidency, for an application of the term “imperial 
presidency,” which was first coined by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. in his 1973 book titled, THE 
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY. 
207. Executive Orders, FEDERAL REGISTER, https://www.federalregister.gov/executive-
orders (last visited March 3, 2018).
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By President Trump’s 100th day in office, EPA had rolled back 
twenty-three Obama-era policies,208 including numerous executive 
orders naming specific regulations President Trump targeted dur-
ing his campaign, such as the Clean Power Plan, WOTUS, and 
rules governing methane capture in oil and gas production.209 The 
table below depicts regulatory reform enacted during the first year 
of the Trump administration that directly or indirectly impacts the 
environment:
TABLE 4. EXECUTIVE ORDERS PERTAINING TO REGULATORY REFORM
AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Executive 
Order 
Number
Title Publica-
tion Date
Date 
Signed 
Citation
13766 Expediting 
Environmental 
Reviews and 
Approvals for High 
Priority 
Infrastructure 
Projects
1/30/17 1/24/17 82 FR 8657
13771 Reducing 
Regulation and 
Controlling
Regulatory Costs
2/3/17 1/30/17 82 FR 9339
13777 Enforcing the 
Regulatory Reform 
Agenda
3/1/17 2/24/17 82 FR 12285
13778 Restoring the Rule 
of Law, Federalism, 
and Economic 
Growth by 
Reviewing the 
“Waters of the 
United States” Rule
3/3/17 2/28/17 82 FR 12497
13783 Promoting Energy 
Independence and 
Economic Growth
3/31/17 3/28/17 82 FR 16093
13795 Implementing an 
America-First 
Offshore Energy 
5/3/17 4/28/17 82 FR 20815
208. Nadja Popovich & Tatiana Schlossberg, 23 Environmental Rules Rolled Back in Trump’s 
First 100 Days, NY Times (May 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/
02/climate/environmental-rules-reversed-trump-100-days.html.
209. See Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 
(Mar. 31, 2017); Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth by Reviewing 
the “Waters of the United States,” Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017); Enforcing the 
Regulatory Reform Agenda, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Mar. 1, 2017); Reducing Regulation and 
Controlling Regulatory Costs, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017).
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Strategy
13805 Establishing a 
Presidential 
Advisory Council on 
Infrastructure
7/25/17 7/19/17 82 FR 34383
13806 Assessing and 
Strengthening the 
Manufacturing and 
Defense Industrial
Base and Supply 
Chain Resiliency of 
the United States
7/26/17 7/21/17 82 FR 34597
13807 Establishing 
Discipline and 
Accountability in 
the Environmental 
Review and 
Permitting Process 
for Infrastructure 
Projects
8/24/17 8/15/17 82 FR 40463
13812 Revocation of 
Executive Order 
Creating Labor-
Management 
Forums
10/4/17 9/29/17 82 FR 46367
CONCLUSION
Regulations are in place for agencies to fulfill their statutory 
missions set by Congress and to best protect the public from a myr-
iad of threats to public health, safety, and the environment. E.O. 
13778 and the accompanying EPA WOTUS notice are significant 
since they carve out a new principle that the federal government 
has an “inherent authority to reconsider past decisions and to re-
vise, replace or repeal a decision” 210 just by giving a “a reasoned 
explanation.”211
210. Exec. Order 13778, Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth 
by Reviewing the “Waters of the United States’” Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017); 
Executive Order 13783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2018)(first citing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 
515 (2009); then citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)).
211. Exec. Order 13778, Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic Growth 
by Reviewing the “Waters of the United States” Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017); 
Executive Order 13783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. 
Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2018).
SUMMER 2018] Environmental Health After E.O.13771 713
Until the Trump presidency, new presidents recognized that the 
Administrative Procedure Act and the Take Care Clause of the U.S.
Constitution precluded new administrations from removing feder-
al regulations just because the new president does not like the reg-
ulations—regardless of political promises or pressure. Under the 
well-established State Farm doctrine set by the Supreme Court, a 
new administration must go through the very same administrative 
process requiring notice and comment in order to remove a regu-
lation already on the books.212 Furthermore, the new administra-
tion must show a valid legal, scientific, or economic reason (or a 
combination of reasons) that necessitates repudiation of the exist-
ing promulgated standard.
Requiring the withdrawal of two promulgated rules for every 
new one created is a radical concept that dramatically increases 
agency workloads.213 The net effect of implementing President 
Trump’s two-for-one executive order is that a federal agency must 
now undertake not one, but three simultaneous administrative 
proceedings in order to implement congressional dictates. The 
practical effect of E.O. 13771 and E.O. 13777 is to bring gridlock 
to the federal administrative process. The mandate of President 
Trump’s two-for-one executive order prevents discretionary agency 
rulemaking efforts and adds a significant layer of complexity and 
analysis to federal rulemaking beyond already significant existing 
substantive and procedural requirements.214
Moreover, the two-for-one system is arbitrary on its face. The 
White House mandate considers the monetized costs to business 
interests but neglects to consider public benefits gained as a result 
of regulations.215 Environmental regulations are designed to pro-
tect human health and prevent adverse health impacts, such as 
asthma, cancer, and endocrine disruption by reducing human 
chemical exposure. Preventing illness through effective environ-
mental regulation reduces health care costs and relieves pressure 
on the overloaded Medicare and Medicaid system. The Trump 
administration’s two-for-one program does not allow for considera-
tion of costs avoided due to illnesses prevented. Moreover, the two-
212. See Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. at 
41.
213. Letter from Andrew A. Rosenberg, Dir., Ctr. for Sci. and Democracy, to Dominic J. 
Mancini, Acting Adm’r, Office of Management and Budget, (Feb. 10, 2017), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OMB-2017-0002-0041.
214. Trump Administration Acts to Reduce Regulations and Control Regulatory Costs, V&E
ENVTL. L. UPDATE E-COMMUNICATION (Feb. 8, 2017), http://www.velaw.com/Insights/
Trump-Administration-Acts-to-Reduce-Regulations-and-Control-Regulatory-Costs/?utm_
source=email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=es%20digest%20-%2002-14-2017.
215. See Letter from Andrew A. Rosenberg to Dominic J. Mancini, supra note 213.
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for-one program, which was created as a campaign promise, has no 
economic theory or study to support it.
Regulations, including environmental regulation, can be cum-
bersome, difficult to understand, and, at times, quite costly. There 
are well-documented cases of specific regulators taking unreasona-
ble positions, with some even acting “greener than thou.” As such, 
regulatory reform has been a consistent theme through numerous 
presidencies. Even industry, however, acknowledges that the two-
for-one solution offered by President Trump should be reevaluated 
to be sure it is not causing more harm than good. 216
216. See, e.g., Shell, Comment on Interim Guidance Implementing Section 2 of the Ex-
ecutive Order of January 30, 2017, Titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory 
Costs” (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=OMB-2017-0002-0050.
